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Malice Maintenance Is “Runnin’ Wild”
A DEMAND FOR DISCLOSURE OF THIRDPARTY LITIGATION FUNDING
INTRODUCTION
In 2012, Terry Gene Bollea, better known as Hulk Hogan,
sued Gawker Media (Gawker) for publishing a ninety-second1
clip of a sex tape of Bollea and his friend’s wife.2 Bollea won the
lawsuit and a jury awarded him a $140 million verdict.3 Three
months later, Gawker filed for bankruptcy4 and shut its website
down entirely.5 How did one man manage to successfully take
down a multi-million dollar company6 like Gawker? Third-party
litigation funding.
Unbeknownst to Gawker or the court, Peter Thiel, a
wealthy businessman unrelated to the Bollea lawsuit had been
funding the litigation.7 Although Thiel was not a party to the
1 Mathew Ingram, Here’s Why the Gawker Verdict Should Be—and Likely Will Be—
Overturned, FORTUNE (Mar. 22, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/03/22/gawker-hogan-appeal/
[http://perma.cc/JBC8-Q439] [hereinafter Ingram, Gawker Verdict Should Be Overturned].
2 Matt Drange, Peter Thiel’s War on Gawker: A Timeline, FORBES (June 21, 2016,
1:22 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/mattdrange/2016/06/21/peter-thiels-war-on-gawker-atimeline/#bd87d917e80f [http://perma.cc/L4YC-QXKV]; see also David Margolick, Nick
Denton, Peter Thiel, and the Plot to Murder Gawker, VANITY FAIR (Nov. 6, 2016, 9:00 AM),
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/11/nick-denton-peter-thiel-plot-to-murder-gawker
[http://perma.cc/BCH4-SH99].
3 Alison Frankel, COLUMN-Billionaire backing of Hogan won’t upend $140
mln Gawker verdict: Frankel, REUTERS (May 25, 2016, 5:55 PM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/gawker-lawsuit-frankel-idUSL2N18M26V [http://perma.cc/3WAT-357V].
4 Mathew Ingram, Billionaire Who Helped Bankrupt Gawker Says He Would Do
it Again, FORTUNE (Aug. 15, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/08/15/thiel-essay-gawker/ [http://
perma.cc/FFY3-DY7B] [hereinafter Ingram, Billionaire Who Helped Bankrupt Gawker].
5 Drange, supra note 2; see also Sydney Ember, Gawker and Hulk Hogan Reach
$31 Million Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/
03/business/media/gawker-hulk-hogan-settlement.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/H92H-MC8X].
6 Alyson Shontell, Gawker Media Generated $45 Million in Net Revenue Last
Year and It’s Raising $15 Million Round of Debt, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 28, 2015, 7:47 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/gawker-media-raising-money-2015-1
[http://perma.cc/9TG6-6ZKT] (“the company’s 2014 net revenue of $45 million”).
7 Andrew Ross Sorkin, Peter Thiel, Tech Billionaire Reveals Secret War with
Gawker, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/26/business/dealbook/
peter-thiel-tech-billionaire-reveals-secret-war-with-gawker.html [http://perma.cc/8UPE7NQ8] [hereinafter Sorkin, Tech Billionaire Reveals Secret War] (“Mr. Bollea had a secret
benefactor paying about $10 million for the lawsuit: Peter Thiel, a co-founder of PayPal
and one of the earliest investors in Facebook.”).
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lawsuit, he had a past with the media outlet: twelve years earlier,
Gawker published an article outing Thiel as gay.8 Thiel has
funded multiple lawsuits against Gawker, never disclosing his
involvement during the course of litigation.9 Thiel’s actions are
legal—third-party litigation funding (TPLF), for whatever motive
or amount, need not be disclosed to the court or opposing parties.10
TPLF is when a nonparty, who does not have a direct
stake in litigation, funds the lawsuit.11 There are varying
motivations that drive TPLF arrangements, including investors
seeking to gain a stake in the potential profit of the lawsuit or
public interest groups sponsoring impact litigation.12 “TPLF is
largely unregulated,”13 yet it is a growing practice14 that has the
potential to cause many negative ethical and legal implications.
This note discusses one particular type of TPLF, referred to

8 Id.; see also David Streitfeld & Katie Benner, In Silicon Valley, Gossip,
Anger and Revenge, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/26/
technology/gossip-in-silicon-valley-and-the-digital-age.html [http://perma.cc/WN3P-DYNF]
(“[T]he tech gossip blog said in late 2007 that Peter Thiel, who co-founded PayPal and
was an early and significant investor in Facebook, was gay.”).
9 Sorkin, Tech Billionaire Reveals Secret War, supra note 7; see also Ryan Mac &
Matt Drange, Behind Peter Thiel’s Plan to Destroy Gawker, FORBES (June 7, 2016, 2:51 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanmac/2016/06/07/behind-peter-thiel-plan-to-destroy-gawker/
#44abaff05848 [http://perma.cc/R9N3-EH5F] [hereinafter Ryan Mac & Matt Drange,
Behind Peter Thiel’s Plan] (“Thiel is the clandestine financier of numerous lawsuits
targeting Gawker Media.”).
10 See Lisa A. Rickard & Mark Behrens, OPINION: 3rd-Party Litigation Funding
Needs Transparency, LAW360 (Oct. 17, 2016, 1:46 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/852142/
opinion-3rd-party-litigation-funding-needs-transparency [http://perma.cc/4BQ9-EV69].
11 See Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana Ltd. P’ship., 532 S.E.2d 269, 273 (S.C. 2000)
(Third parties may fund lawsuits to “purchase an interest in the outcome of a case in
which he [or she] has no interest otherwise” or “stir[ ] up quarrels and suits between
other individuals”.) (citing 14 C.J.S. Champerty and Maintenance § 17 and § 2)); see also
Lawrence S. Schaner & Thomas G. Appleman, The Rise of 3rd-Party Litigation Funding,
LAW360 (Jan. 21, 2011, 2:06 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/218954/the-rise-of3rd-party-litigation-funding [https://perma.cc/RFL2-PX38].
12 See, e.g., Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party
Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268, 1269–70 (2011) (Steinitz provides a series of
hypothetical scenarios “made possible by . . . third-party litigation funding” whereby
funders may be motived by profit, personal gain, or redress for the claimants.).
13 Third Party Litigation Funding (TPLF), U.S. CHAMBER OF COM. INST. FOR
LEGAL REFORM (Oct. 2009), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/issues/third-partylitigation-funding [http://perma.cc/LW77-MX5Y]; see also BEISNER ET AL., SELLING
LAWSUITS, BUYING TROUBLE: THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING IN THE UNITED STATES
4 (2009), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/thirdpartylitigationfina
ncing.pdf [https://perma.cc/9APU-A2ZB] (“Today, third-party funding is governed in the
United States by a patchwork of relatively weak laws, cases, rules, and regulations—
and they are only in force in a handful of states. There does not appear to be a nationwide
consensus, or even a nationwide conversation, on whether the doctrines of maintenance
and champerty should be abolished, whether litigation funding should be allowed, or, if
it is, how it should be regulated.”).
14 See Maya Steinitz & Abigail C. Field, A Model Litigation Finance Contract,
99 IOWA L. REV. 711, 713 (2014).
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throughout this note as “malice maintenance,”15 whereby a third
party intermeddles in a lawsuit by assisting one party “out of
pure spite or malevolence towards the target of the [lawsuit].”16
This mode of TPLF is motivated by a personal interest in the
lawsuit rather than monetary gain.17 Malice maintenance
amplifies the ethical and legal implications associated with
TPLF. The third-party financer is in a unique position to create
a conflict of interest between litigants and their attorneys18 by
influencing the legal strategy employed and therefore limiting or
completely eliminating the plaintiff’s control over both the
development and outcome of the lawsuit.19 That level of control,
coupled with the funder’s malicious personal agenda undermines
the justice system.20 Although there are rules to prevent third
parties from influencing attorneys,21 no general rule currently
exists that requires transparency in these arrangements.22 Courts,
as well as targets of malice maintenance, are therefore most likely
unaware that a third-party investor is involved in the lawsuit at
all.23 Without a complete picture of what or whom they are up
against and the potential ulterior motives behind the lawsuit,
targets of malice maintenance are ill equipped to defend their
position or adjust their legal strategy accordingly.24 Most
importantly, courts are ill equipped to address issues stemming

15 This term was coined by Anthony J. Sebok, Professor of Law at Benjamin N.
Cardozo School of Law. See Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV.
61, 103 (2011).
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 See
BEISNER ET AL., supra note 13, at 7 (“[L]itigation-financing
arrangements undercut the plaintiff ’ s control over his or her own claim because
investors inherently desire to protect their investment and will therefore seek to exert
control over strategic decisions in the lawsuit.”).
19 Victoria A. Shannon, Harmonizing Third-Party Litigation Funding
Regulation, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 861, 863–64 (2015) (“[D]epending on the structure of
the funding arrangement, the funder may legally control or influence aspects of the legal
representation or may completely take over the case and step into the shoes of the
original party.”).
20 See Third Party Litigation Funding (TPLF), supra note 13.
21 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(f) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (“A
lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the
client unless: . . . [inter alia] (2) there is no interference with the lawyer’s independence
of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship . . . .”).
22 Shannon, supra note 19, at 903 (“Currently, litigation funding takes place
largely in secret, and there is no general rule that the parties or their legal counsel must
disclose identities of funders.”); see also Rickard & Behrens, supra note 10.
23 See Rickard & Behrens, supra note 10 (“Courts trying to settle cases may be
unaware that their efforts may be complicated by an entity that is not even in the room.”).
24 See id. (“[T]he funder’s presence can unreasonably prolong cases and
frustrate settlements.”).
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from third-party funding when the existence of the third-party
funder is unknown.25
The most troubling aspect of malice maintenance is
intuitive—it gives wealthy individuals the power to instigate
litigation based on their own whims.26 Malicious maintainers
have no interest in the lawsuits they fund other than their own
personal agenda.27 They may choose to bring a lawsuit to slow
progress of competition within their industry, or they may
simply wish to stir up strife against certain individuals,
businesses, or corporations with whom they disapprove or
disagree. In either scenario, the lawsuits need not be successful
for the third-party funders to accomplish their intended
objective.28 By prolonging litigation or funding multiple suits at
one time or over a period of time, there is still the potential to
tarnish the reputation of the target or cause the target to expend
excessive amounts of money. Essentially, wealthy individuals
have free range to finance litigation, in secret and driven by
personal ulterior motives, without any legal consequences.29
Due to a complete lack of transparency under the current
law, wealthy individuals are empowered to instigate and
influence litigation to advance their personal interests without
the risk of consequences.30 This note proposes amending Rule
26(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to require initial
disclosure of third-party funders of a lawsuit to both the court
and opposing parties.31 Part I recounts the ancient legal history
of maintenance under British common law and discusses the
evolution of maintenance in the United States. Part II examines
Bollea v. Gawker, a recent and controversial example of secret
third-party funding of litigation. Part III explores the policy
considerations related specifically to malice maintenance. Part
IV provides a framework for regulating TPLF that will address

25 Id. (“Courts trying to settle cases may be unaware that their efforts may be
complicated by an entity that is not even in the room.”).
26 See Sebok, supra note 15, at 102.
27 See id.
28 Consider the case of Bollea v. Gawker Media. It was not necessary for the
plaintiff of the lawsuit, Terry Bollea, to win the lawsuit in order to accomplish his
funder’s objectives. See infra Part II.
29 See generally BURFORD, ETHICS ARTICLE NO. 3: DISCLOSURE OF LITIGATION
FUNDING FINANCING NOT REQUIRED BY COURT RULES, http://www.burfordcapital.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/01/Ethics-Article-3-Disclosure-Not-Required.pdf [http://perma.cc/
M6FG-JUKQ].
30 See Rickard & Behrens, supra note 10.
31 See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, STOPPING THE SALE ON
LAWSUITS: A PROPOSAL TO REGULATE THIRD-PARTY INVESTMENTS IN LITIGATION 2 (2012)
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/TPLF_Solutions.pdf [http://perma.cc/
HU76-LENJ].
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some of the potential negative effects of malice maintenance and
promote transparency.
I.

LEGAL HISTORY OF MAINTENANCE

An understanding of the British common law doctrine
prohibiting maintenance is critical in evaluating the dangers of
malice maintenance. The United States’ treatment of maintenance
has evolved over time, with a trend toward limiting prohibitions in
order to guarantee equal access to the justice system. The
underlying ethical concerns related to the practice, however,
remain today. Where third-party funders are known to the court—
whether public interest groups, individual attorneys, or
investment companies—courts are careful to note who is funding
the lawsuit and why.
A.

British Common Law Doctrine

British common law prohibited three types of third-party
litigation funding: barratry, champerty, and maintenance.32
“Barratry” is defined as “frequently exciting and stirring up quarrels
and suits between other individuals,” while “champerty” is defined
as funding a lawsuit to get a portion of the proceeds.33 Since
“maintenance” is defined as “an officious intermeddling in a suit that
in no way belongs to one, by maintaining or assisting either party
with money or otherwise to prosecute or defend [the suit],”34 both
champerty and barratry are considered forms of maintenance.35
The prohibition on maintenance originated during the
feudal era36 due to the common practice of wealthy feudal lords
funding the legal disputes of underprivileged members of society
against a third party who was often a “personal or political
enemy” of the lord.37 In return for funding, the lords acquired a
portion of the proceeds if the lawsuit was successful.38 These
arrangements allowed powerful individuals to take advantage of
Osprey v. Cabana Ltd. P’shp, 532 S.E.2d 269, 272–73 (S.C. 2000).
Id. at 273.
34 Id. (quoting 14 C.J.S. Champerty and Maintenance § 2(b); 14 AM. JUR. 2D
Champerty and Maintenance § 2.).
35 Id.
36 Id. at 274; see also Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, CAL. L. REV. 48,
64 (1935) (“But the maintenance is that against which the Star Chamber Act of 1487 and
the Statute of Liveries of 1504 were specifically directed, i.e., the support given the feudal
magnate to his retainers in all their suits, without any reference to their justification.”
(footnote omitted)).
37 Del Webb Cmtys., Inc. v. Partington, 2:08-cv-00571-RCJ-GWF, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 85616, *1, *10 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2009).
38 Id.
32
33
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the court system by using unsavory tactics such as “the
employment of bullies to prevent an opponent from appearing in
court at a critical moment,”39 to influence the outcome of lawsuits
with the goal of maximizing their own personal and political
interests.40 Maintenance essentially became a “means by which
powerful men aggrandized their estates and the background was
unquestionably that of private war.”41 In response to this practice,
England codified a law criminalizing maintenance42 in order to
prevent the “stirring up” of frivolous or vexatious litigation.43
B.

Maintenance in the United States

Many of the states that currently prohibit maintenance
adopted the British common law prohibition over a century
ago.44 Throughout the twentieth century, however, the attitude
towards litigation shifted, as did American courts’ treatment of
maintenance.45 Litigation emerged as a tool “for changing the
status quo, for challenging the powerful, for rearranging the
economic and political landscape for . . . achieving social
change.”46 Part of the shift in thinking can be attributed to the
emergence of numerous state agencies, the Legal Aid Society,
and civil rights groups that provided assistance to indigent
clients.47 As the principles underlying public interest litigation
rose in favor, limitations on maintenance began to fall away.48
Osprey, 340 S.C. at 273–74.
See id.
41 Radin, supra note 36, at 64.
42 Id. at 65.
43 Jason Lyon, Revolution in Progress: Third-Party Funding of American
Litigation, 58 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 571, 575 (2010) (quoting 14 AM. JUR. 2D Champerty,
Maintenance, and Barratry § 1 (2009)).
44 Christy B. Bushnell, Champerty is Still No Excuse in Texas: Why Texas
Courts (and the Legislature) Should Uphold Litigation Funding Agreements, VII HOUS.
BUS. & TAX L.J. 358, 369 (2007) (“Many of the states that absolutely prohibit
champertous agreements have followed the English common law prohibition for over a
century . . . .”); see also Lyon, supra note 43, at 581 (“Maintenance and champerty found
their way into American jurisprudence via common law . . . .”).
45 Lyon, supra note 43, at 587. In 1935, Max Radin, an American legal scholar
that published a well-known study of maintenance, claimed that the common law
doctrines did not align with the American public’s perception about litigation and were
“largely dead” in practice. See generally Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CAL.
L. REV. 48 (1935).
46 Lyon, supra note 43, at 587 (alteration in original) (quoting Stephen C.
Yeazell, Brown, The Civil Rights Movement, and the Silent Litigation Revolution, 57
VAND. L. REV. 1975, 2000–01 (2004)).
47 Id. at 582. In 1929, Judge Cardozo distinguished between “maintenance inspired
by charity or benevolence” and maintenance inspired by “spite or envy or the promise or hope
of gain.” In re Gilman 167 N.E. 437, 439 (N.Y. 1929). He acknowledged the importance of
maintenance to assist indigent individuals but warned against the dangers of “oppressive
intermeddling of wealth or officialdom for publicity or profit.” Id. at 440.
48 Lyon, supra note 43, at 582.
39
40
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Prohibitions on maintenance remained intact, however, as
related to restraints on an attorney’s right to stir up lawsuits
through solicitation of clients.49 Until the 1960s, antimaintenance
statutes prohibited lawyers and legal organizations from funding
and maintaining lawsuits.50 The landmark Supreme Court case
NAACP v. Button struck down a Virginia antimaintenance statute
and caused a major shift in the United States’ position on TPFL.51
In Button, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment
protected the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP) lawyers’ solicitation of clients to fund and
maintain civil rights claims.52 The Court determined that
Virginia’s interest in prohibiting TPLF could not overcome the
constitutional right of the NAACP lawyers to engage in expressive
and associational activities, both through civil rights litigation as
well as advocacy work.53
Justice Brennan, however, was careful to clarify the type
of litigation the Court was concerned about protecting under the
First Amendment: “Resort[ing] to the courts to seek vindication
of constitutional rights is a different matter from the oppressive,
malicious, or avaricious use of the legal process for purely
private gain.”54 Justice Brennan was concerned with ensuring
indigent litigants’ equal access to the justice system, finding that
public-interest-motivated collective action is necessary to
achieve that objective.55
Fifteen years after Button, in In Re Primus, the Court
extended its holding to protect individual attorneys acting on
behalf of an organization as long as their actions are driven by
political expression.56 On the same day the Court decided In Re

Id.
Id.
51 See Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
at 439 (1963) (“However valid may be Virginia’s interest in regulating the traditionally
illegal practices of barratry, maintenance and champerty, that interest does not justify
the prohibition of the NAACP activities disclosed by the record.”). The NAACP brought
suit to invalidate a Virginia antimaintenance statute that prohibited “the improper
solicitation of any legal or professional business.” Id. at 419.
52 Id. at 439–45.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 443.
55 Id.; see In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 426 (1978).
56 In In Re Primus, an attorney working for the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) sent a letter to a woman who had been sterilized due to long-term medical
treatment, and offered to take on all costs of a suit against the doctor who performed the
procedure. Primus was accused of engaging in unlawful solicitation. In re Primus, 436
U.S. at 412. The Court reasoned that the record reflected no “undue influence,
overreaching, misrepresentation, or invasion of privacy” or “a serious likelihood of
conflict of interest.” Id. at 413, 435–36. Focusing on the ACLU’s clear political objective
to only enter into cases where “substantial civil liberty questions are involved,” the Court
49
50
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Primus, the Court also decided Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n,
finding Ohio’s indefinite suspension of an attorney reasonable
because the attorney’s solicitation of litigants was largely
motivated by monetary gain.57 The Court clarified that outside
of political expression or an exercise of associational freedom, an
attorney’s in-person solicitation to instigate a lawsuit for
financial gain is not entitled to First Amendment protection.58
The Court’s holdings in In Re Primus and Ohralik, suggest that
the purpose for instigating and maintaining the lawsuit—
whether for personal gain or the vindication of the rights of an
actual party to the lawsuit—is still of concern to the Court.59
C.

Current Status of the Law

Though the First Amendment protects certain solicitation
and lawsuit funding, the treatment of maintenance still varies
across the United States.60 Some states have upheld the common
law doctrines of maintenance while others have limited their scope
and application or abolished the doctrines outright.61 Currently,
twenty-eight out of fifty-one jurisdictions have abolished total
prohibition of champerty.62 Despite varying interpretations,63

found that Primus’s actions fell within the scope of the protection of the First
Amendment. Id. at 427 (quoting Button, 371 U.S. at 440 n.19).
57 See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 449 (1978). Ohralik, a
member of the Ohio Bar, received information about an automobile accident of a young
woman and visited her in the hospital to offer his services in exchange for one-third of
her recovery from the lawsuit. Id. at 449–50.
58 See id. at 467–68.
59 See In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 438–39; see also Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 468.
60 Jaqueline Sheridan, Champerty and Maintenance, DINSMORE (Jan. 22, 2016),
http://www.dinsmore.com/publications/champerty-and-maintenance-in-the-modern-era/
[http://perma.cc/RU2Z-5FYH].
61 Id.
62 Sebok, supra note 15, at 98–99.
63 The American Bar Association reports that a number of other states,
including “Arizona, California, Connecticut, New Jersey, New Hampshire, New Mexico
and Texas” never adopted common law champerty prohibitions. ETHICS COMM. OF THE
COM. AND F ED . LITIG. S ECTION OF THE N.Y. S. BAR ASS’ N, REPORT ON THE ETHICAL
IMPLICATION OF THIRD-P ARTY L ITIGATION F UNDING 12 (2013), https://www.bentham
imf.com/docs/default-source/default-document-library/nys-bar—-opinion-of-ethicalimplications-04-16-13.pdf?sfvrsn=2 [http://perma.cc/C32Y-FZ4L]. Other states such
as Massachusetts and Florida have explicitly abolished the common law prohibitions
on champerty they had previously adopted from England. Id. at 12. In Kraft v. Mason,
the Florida appellate court strayed away from the more stringent original common law
champerty, and held that “officious intermeddling is a necessary element of champerty.”
Kraft v. Mason, 668 So. 2d. 679, 682 (4th Dist. Fla. Ct. App. 1996). In 1997, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court struck down champerty laws finding that these doctrines
are no longer necessary “to protect against the evils once feared.” Saladini v. Righellis,
687 N.E.2d. 1224, 1226 (Mass. 1997).
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however, “[t]he consistent trend across the country is toward
limiting, not expanding” prohibitions.64
Most recently, champerty has been analyzed by the
courts in the context of third-party litigation funding
agreements. Modern maintenance has evolved from a tool for
feudal lords65 to a complex business transaction between
litigants and companies created solely to invest in lawsuits.66
Saladini v. Righellis is one of the earliest cases to consider the
validity of third-party litigation lending agreements.67 In
Saladini, in exchange for a certain percentage of the settlement
funds that remained after paying attorney’s fees, a third-party
funder lent money to the litigant to pursue a lawsuit.68 When the
litigant eventually settled his dispute, he did not inform the
third-party funder or provide any portion of the money owed.69
The third-party funder sued for enforcement of the contract and
the trial court decided the contract was champertous and thus
unenforceable.70 On appeal, however, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts reversed the lower court’s holding and
abolished the prohibition on champerty in Massachusetts.71 The
court stated that Massachusetts has “long abandoned the view
that litigation is suspect, and [has] recognized that agreements
to purchase an interest in an action may actually foster
resolution of a dispute.”72 The court reasoned that abolishing
champerty is no longer “needed to protect against the evils once
feared: speculation in lawsuits, the bringing of frivolous
lawsuits, or financial overreaching by a party of a superior
bargaining position,” finding that there are other tools that
“more effectively accomplish these ends.”73

Del Webb Cmtys. Inc. v. Partington, 652 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2011).
Del Webb Cmtys, Inc. v. Partington, No. 2:08-cv-00571-RCJ-GWF, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 85616, at *10 (D. Nev. Sept. 18, 2009).
66 Alexis Keenan Weed, Do Investing and Justice Mix? Companies that
Fund Lawsuits are Hailed—and Blasted, CNN M ONEY (Apr. 20, 2016, 11:58 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2016/04/15/investing/litigation-finance/index.html [http://perma.cc/
74DP-BV4W].
67 Lyon, supra note 43, at 584.
68 Saladini, 687 N.E.2d. at 1224–25.
69 Id. at 1225.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 1226–28.
72 Id. at 1226.
73 Id. at 1226–27. The court elaborated on what was meant by tools:
64

65

Our rule governing contingent fees between attorneys and clients is based on
the principle that an attorney’s fee must be reasonable. We also recognize a
public policy against the recovery of excessive fees. Additional devices include
[Massachusetts state laws that] provid[e] sanctions for misconduct,
and regulat[e] the bringing of frivolous lawsuits, and the doctrines of
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Six years after Saladini, the Supreme Court of Ohio
considered the same issue of litigation funding with the opposite
result, finding the litigation funding contract at issue void as
maintenance and champerty.74 The court reasoned that “a
lawsuit is not an investment vehicle,”75 concluding that these
types of agreements “give[ ] a nonparty an impermissible
interest in a suit, impede[ ] the settlement of an underlying case,
and promote[ ] speculation in lawsuits.”76 Two years later the
Supreme Court of Nassau County, New York upheld a similar
litigation-funding agreement,77 but noted that they “tend[ ] to agree
with the policy considerations adopted by [the Ohio Supreme
Court].”78 The Nassau County Court recognized that “part of the
policy behind [prohibitions on] Champerty is to prevent noninterested third parties from taking part in litigation” in order to
“prevent[ ] strife, discord, and harassment.”79 The court further
acknowledged the potential for a funder to take total control of
the lawsuit, although they determined that was not the case in
the arrangement at issue.80

unconscionability, duress, and good faith, establish standards of fair dealing
between opposing parties.
Id. at 1227 (internal citations omitted).
74 See Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp. 789 N.E.2d 217, 221 (Ohio
2003). In Rancman, the plaintiff (Rancman) was seriously injured in a car accident and filed
suit against her insurance company. Id. at 218. Rancman did not want to wait for her case to
settle before receiving any of the proceeds, and decided to contact the defendant, Interim
Settlement Funding Corp (Interim), seeking an advance payment. Id. Rancman received
$6,000 in exchange for a certain rate of return from her future settlement funds contingent
on the length of time until resolution of her suit. Id. at 218–19. After settling her lawsuit for
$100,000 within twelve months, Rancman refused to make her payments and filed suit
against Interim seeking rescission of the contract. Id. at 219.
75 Id. at 221. In the opinion, the court noted that “[t]he ancient practices of
champerty and maintenance have been vilified in Ohio since the early years of our
statehood,” and are considered “offense[s] against public justice, as [they] keep[ ] alive
strife and contention, and pervert[ ] the remedial practice of the law into an engine of
oppression.” Id. at 220 (quoting Key v. Vattier, 1 Ohio 132, 136 (1823)).
76 Id. at 221.
77 Echeverria v. Estate of Lindner, No. 018666/2002, 2005 WL 1083704, *1,*5
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005). In Echeverria, the plaintiff was injured in a scaffolding accident
and entered into an agreement with LawCash, whereby the plaintiff would receive
$25,000 in exchange for the repayment of this principal amount at an interest rate of
3.85 percent compounded monthly from any judgment rendered. Id. at *1–3. The court
held that LawCash’s loan or investment was not champertous because its primary
objective was not based on a claim to a portion of the judgment, but “simply to profit from
its loan or investment.” Id. at *5. The court ultimately decided that, “Champerty law was
not written to deal with the situation that has developed from this modern form of
business which advances plaintiffs’ funding for their lawsuit in exchange for a portion of
the judgment.” Id. at *6.
78 Id. at *7.
79 Id.
80 Id. (“While LawCash has not had any control over the litigation, part of the
policy behind Champerty is to prevent non-interested third parties from taking part in
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In response to the Rancman decision, the Ohio legislature
adopted a bill that regulated “non-recourse civil litigation
advances,” which effectively overturned the court’s decision and
sanctioned the use of litigation-funding companies.81 After
passing this bill, Ohio became the only state apart from Maine to
pass legislation to regulate this practice.82 Some of the regulations
in the bill included requiring certain disclosures in the contracts,
such as the dollar amount to be advanced to the consumer and
“written acknowledgment by the attorney representing the
consumer in the civil action or claim.”83 Most importantly, the bill
prohibits legal funding companies from having any right to
influence legal decisions.84
Only two states currently follow the early English common
law approach, and prohibit any form of maintenance: Mississippi
and Illinois.85 Discussion about the legality of maintenance and
champerty, however, are still relevant in the court system today.86
In 2016, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania found a litigation
funding arrangement as champertous.87 There, a third-party
litigation funding company loaned money to fund a lawsuit
whereby the attorney would be paid via expected counsel’s fees.88
The court recognized that “the common law doctrine of champerty
remains a viable defense in Pennsylvania,”89 and found that the
attorney’s agreement to pay Litigation Fund Investors out of his
fees was invalid as champertous because the third-party funders
litigation . . . While LawCash is not bringing suit or action based on its claim to the
judgement, there is potential for this to become a problem in the future.”).
81 Lyon, supra note 43, at 586 (citing Mark M. Bello, Lawsuit Funding—New
Legislation in Ohio, OHIO TRIAL, 28, 29 (2009), https://www.lawsuitfinancial.com/files/
ohio.pdf) [http://perma.cc/946P-QZY3]).
82 Bello, supra note 81, at 29.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN 5/32–12 (LexisNexis 2012) (“If a person officiously
intermeddles in an action that in no way belongs to or concerns that person, by
maintaining or assisting either party, with money or otherwise, to prosecute or defend
the action, with a view to promote litigation, he or she is guilty of maintenance and upon
conviction shall be fined and punished as in cases of common barratry. It is not
maintenance for a person to maintain the action of his or her relative or servant, or a
poor person out of charity.”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97–9–11 (2013) (“It shall be unlawful
for any person . . . either before or after proceedings commenced: (a) to promise, give, or
offer, or to conspire or agree to promise, give, or offer, (b) to receive or accept, or to agree
or conspire to receive or accept, (c) to solicit, request, or donate, any money . . . or any
other thing of value, or any other assistance as an inducement to any person to commence
or to prosecute further, or for the purpose of assisting such person to commence or
prosecute further, any proceeding in any court or before any administrative board or
other agency.”).
86 See WFIC, LLC v. Donald LaBarre, Jr., 148 A.3d 812, 818 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016)
(“[W]e conclude that the 2008 Fee Agreement is champertous and, therefore, invalid.”).
87 Id. at 819.
88 Id. at 814–16.
89 Id. at 818 (quoting Frank v. TeWinkle, 45 A.3d 434, 438 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012)).
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had no legitimate interest in the lawsuit, but loaned their money
solely to invest it in the proceeds of the litigation.90 Although
common law prohibitions of maintenance and champerty have
mostly been phased out of state law, the underlying ethical
concerns with third-party funding still remain.91
II.

BOLLEA V. GAWKER—SOMETIMES THE CAMERA ISN’T THE
ONLY THING HIDDEN

This Part begins with a brief background of Bollea v.
Gawker and an introduction of the third-party funder’s role in
the lawsuit. An analysis of this case as a modern example of
malice maintenance follows.
A.

Brief Background of Bollea v. Gawker

In a highly-publicized lawsuit, Bollea sued Gawker
Media for publishing a ninety-second clip of his sex tape on its
website.92 Gawker published footage of Bollea with his friend’s
wife on October 4, 2012; the video subsequently gained over
seven million views.93 The following day, Bollea’s personal
attorney, David Houston, demanded that Gawker remove the
tape from its website.94 By October 5, 2012, Bollea had obtained
a new lawyer, Charles Harder, who filed a claim against
Gawker95 in federal court seeking an injunction, which was
dismissed.96 Shifting his legal strategy, Bollea next filed suit in
state court97 which proved fruitful for him: a six-person Florida
jury awarded him a $140 million verdict.98 Three months after
the verdict, Gawker filed for bankruptcy99 and the case ultimately
Id. at 819.
See supra Sections I.A–B.
92 Ingram, Gawker Verdict Should Be Overturned, supra note 1.
93 Drange, supra note 2.
94 Id.
95 Id. (“Hulk Hogan’s new lawyer, Charles Harder, files a lawsuit against
Gawker in a Florida court.”).
96 See Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, 913 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1331 (M.D. Fla.
2012) (The district court, however, denied his preliminary injunction on the grounds that
Bollea failed to introduce any “evidence establishing that he would suffer irreparable
harm in the copyright sense absent preliminary injunctive relief.”).
97 See Nathan McAlone, Everything you need to know about the Hulk Hogan sextape lawsuit that could cost Gawker over $155 million, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 20, 2016, 8:49 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/hulk-hogan-versus-gawker-lawsuit-explained-2016-3
[http://perma.cc/TN2M-FDM6] (Unsuccessful in obtaining a preliminary injunction in
federal court, Bollea then filed suit against Gawker Media in Florida state court.).
98 See Bollea v. Gawker Media, No. 12012447 CI-011, 2016 Fla. Cir. LEXIS 4710,
*1, *1–2 (Fla. Pinellas County Ct. 2016); see also Frankel, supra note 3 (“Hogan . . . won a
$140 million verdict in March against the online news gossip company Gawker Media.”).
99 Ingram, Billionaire Who Helped Bankrupt Gawker, supra note 4.
90

91
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settled for $31 million.100 Univision Communications bought
Gawker which included several websites for $135 million101 and
announced the decision to specifically shut down the Gawker
website that published Bollea’s sex-tape indefinitely.102 Nick
Denton, the founder of Gawker, and a named defendant in the
lawsuit, personally filed for bankruptcy in August of 2016.103
B.

Bollea’s Secret Weapon

Unbeknownst to Gawker during the trial, Peter Thiel, a
third party unrelated to the lawsuit, had been funding Bollea’s
lawsuit in secret.104 Although Thiel was not a party to the
lawsuit, he did have a personal connection to Gawker—twelve
years earlier, Gawker published an article that outed Thiel as
gay.105 In a 2009 interview with PE Hub Network, Thiel
expressed his disdain for Gawker, stating that the news outlet
has “the psychology of a terrorist, where it’s purely destructive”
and comparing it to “the Silicon Valley equivalent of Al
Qaeda.”106 Seven years later, Thiel explained his involvement
with Bollea’s lawsuit to the New York Times, stating that his
actions were “less about revenge and more about specific
deterrence.”107 Through funding litigation against Gawker, Thiel
sought to deter Gawker from publishing articles that, in Thiel’s
opinion, have “no connection with the public interest[ ] ” and are
“painful and paralyzing for people who [are] targeted.”108
Despite Thiel’s proclaimed altruistic justifications for his
actions, this case has gained a great deal of media attention and
has aroused questions about the role of “big money” in the court
Ember, supra note 5.
Univision kept running several websites under the ambit of Gawker Media
including Gizmodo, Jezebel, and Deadspin. Univision executives, however, did decide to
remove at least six articles from those websites due to pending litigation. See Nicole Hensley,
Univision Deletes Seven Gawker Media Stories on Jezebel, Deadspin and Gizmodo due to
active litigation, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 11, 2016, 2:29 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/
news/national/univision-deletes-gawker-stories-due-active-litigation-article-1.2787121
[http://perma.cc/K3KG-YS3Z]; see also Ember, supra note 5.
102 Drange, supra note 2.
103 Id.
104 Sorkin, Tech Billionaire Reveals Secret War, supra note 7 (“Mr. Bollea had a
secret benefactor paying about $10 million for the lawsuit: Peter Thiel, a co-founder of
PayPal and one of the earliest investors in Facebook.”).
105 Id.; see also Streitfeld & Benner, supra note 8 (“[T]he tech gossip blog said
in late 2007 that Peter Thiel, who co-founded PayPal and was an early and significant
investor in Facebook, was gay.”).
106 Connie Loizos, Peter Thiel on Valleywag: It’s the “Silicon Valley Equivalent
of Al Queda,” PE HUB (May 18, 2009), https://www.pehub.com/2009/05/peter-thiel-onvalleywag-its-the-silicon-valley-equivalent-of-al-qaeda/ [http://perma.cc/AU77-ZTFA].
107 Sorkin, Tech Billionaire Reveals Secret War, supra note 7.
108 Id.
100

101
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system and the emergence of TPLF.109 Thiel spent roughly $10
million of his own funds to pay Bollea’s litigation expenses.110
During the trial, there was speculation in the legal community that
the lawsuit may have been funded by someone other than Bollea
due to several suspicious legal decisions made during the course of
the lawsuit.111 Legal experts found Bollea’s legal strategy to
prevent an insurance payout unusual because it is typically
considered intuitive for a plaintiff to favor an insurance company
payout because it creates the potential for a larger settlement.112
C.

Modern-Day Malice Maintenance

It is undisputed that Thiel used his wealthy status to
interfere with a lawsuit to which he was not a party—the precise
definition of maintenance.113 Thiel was not motivated by a
financial interest—he stated that he did not expect to make
money from the Bollea suit and that he did not consider his
decision to fund the lawsuit a “business venture.”114 In addition,
Thiel openly admits that his own negative experience with
Gawker influenced his decision to donate millions of dollars to
fund litigation against the media outlet.115 He considers his
actions “philanthropic” because he used his resources to help
other “victims” that have been harmed by Gawker.116 Although
he would not reveal any details of other cases he has funded
against Gawker, Thiel admits that “[i]t’s safe to say [Bollea’s
lawsuit] is not the only one.”117 Though he justifies his actions as
charitable and altruistic, it remains true that Thiel has
specifically chosen to target Gawker on a number of occasions118
because of his disapproval of the type of news that the media
outlet disseminated.119
Id.
Id.; see also Michael Hiltzik, Peter Thiel, Gawker and the Risks of Making
the Courthouse a Private Sandbox for the Wealthy, and the Courts, L.A. TIMES (May 25,
2016, 2:55 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-thiel-gawker20160525-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/4VFH-CX5A].
111 Andrew Ross Sorkin, Gawker Founder Suspects A Common Financer Behind
Suits, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/24/business/dealbook/
gawker-founder-suspects-a-common-financer-behind-lawsuits.html [http://perma.cc/2NTUUAHE] [hereinafter Sorkin, Gawker Founder] (“[Q]uestions were provoked by several
strategic decisions on Mr. Hogan’s side that didn’t appear economically rational.”).
112 Id.
113 See supra Section I.A.
114 Sorkin, Tech Billionaire Reveals Secret War, supra note 7.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Mac & Drange, Behind Peter Thiel’s Plan, supra note 9 (“Thiel is the
clandestine financier of numerous lawsuits targeting Gawker Media.”).
119 Sorkin, Tech Billionaire Reveals Secret War, supra note 7.
109
110
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The potential for personal interests of a funder to
influence the outcome of a lawsuit is concerning.120 Third-party
funders motivated by malice may influence legal strategies in a
manner that amplifies their own objectives rather than in a
manner that vindicates the rights of the actual party to the
lawsuit. In the case of Bollea v. Gawker, a key decision that
courts should scrutinize is the decision not to allow Gawker
Media’s insurance company to pay part of the settlement.121 If
Thiel had exerted any influence over that decision, it would have
been a serious ethical violation.122 This is because it may not
have been in the best interest of Bollea—who could have
maximized his profits with an insurance payout.123 By dropping
the claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress,124
Gawker’s insurance company was precluded from paying for
Gawker’s defense or any part of the damages awarded to
Bollea.125 Gawker was unable to “leverag[e] the deep pockets of
an insurer” to help settle the case.126 Precluding insurance
payouts can have a crippling effect on a company, and it did
here—Bollea rejected multiple settlement offers127 until Gawker
filed for bankruptcy.128 This type of legal strategy looks a lot less
like specific deterrence or vindication of this particular
plaintiff’s rights and a lot more like revenge against Gawker.
As an early investor in Facebook129 and member of its
board of directors,130 Thiel has been criticized for playing an
120 Julie Triedman, Arms Race: The Litigation Funding Boom, AM. LAW. (Dec.
25, 2015) (“Funders are increasingly encouraging plaintiffs to pick firms they approve of;
other times, they team up with firms to fund portfolios of cases. As the law firm-funder
relationship gets closer, some lawyers worry that the interests of a client and a firm could
diverge.”).
121 See Sorkin, Gawker Founder, supra note 111 (“Several legal experts said
that it was particularly unusual for a plaintiff using a lawyer being paid on a contingency
basis not only to turn down settlement offers (several sizable settlements were proffered
by Gawker) but also to pursue a strategy that prevented an insurance company from
being able to contribute to a settlement.”).
122 See MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(f) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (“A
lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the
client unless: . . . [inter alia] (2) there is no interference with the lawyer’s independence
of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship . . . .”).
123 Mac & Drange, Behind Peter Thiel’s Plan, supra note 9 (“Why didn’t he
accept several settlement offers? And why did he drop his claim involving negligent
infliction of emotional distress—thus freeing the real deep pockets, Gawker’s insurance
company, from paying any part of a potential recovery?”).
124 Id.
125 Sorkin, Tech Billionaire Reveals Secret War, supra note 7.
126 Id.
127 Mac & Drange, Behind Peter Thiel’s Plan, supra note 9.
128 Ingram, Billionaire Who Helped Bankrupt Gawker, supra note 4.
129 Sorkin, Tech Billionaire Reveals Secret War, supra note 7.
130 Jack Shafer, Peter Thiel Does the Impossible!, POLITICO (May 25, 2016),
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/05/gawker-peter-thiel-fourth-estate-213918
[http://perma.cc/W3DZ-P8PG].

1044

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:3

instrumental role in a lawsuit that ultimately destroyed one of
Facebook’s competitors.131 Indeed, the fact that Gawker and
Facebook are both part of the media industry raised concerns
regarding conflict of interest.132 Critics even called for the
removal of Thiel from Facebook’s board of directors due to his
involvement in the Bollea lawsuit.133 Thiel’s actions may set a
very dangerous precedent—one that “could have a chilling effect
on the media business, providing a blueprint by which wealthy
individuals can covertly litigate against publications they find
hurtful or unpleasing.”134
It cannot be determined with certainty whether Thiel
was focused on vindicating the rights of Bollea, or if this was
simply another opportunity for him to destroy Gawker.
Speculation is inevitable, however, because TPLF does not
currently require any form of disclosure.135 But the Gawker case
sheds light on the many potential legal and ethical issues related
to malice maintenance. A funder, without disclosing personal
involvement, can shift legal strategy to preserve the funder’s
own personal interests rather than to obtain justice for the
individual harmed—all while the court is uninformed and ill
equipped to take remedial action.136
On November 2, 2016, Denton announced the decision
not to appeal Bollea’s judgment as Gawker had originally
planned.137 He wrote in his blog, “[a]fter four years of litigation
funded by a billionaire with a grudge going back even further, a
settlement has been reached. The saga is over.”138 Although
Gawker had been confident that they would prevail on appeal,
131 Id. (“Both Gawker and Facebook are media entities, competing with one
another for online ad revenue.”).
132 Id.; see also Ryan Mac & Matt Drange, Mark Zuckerberg Decides to Keep Peter
Thiel on Facebook’s Board, FORBES (June 20, 2016, 2:29 PM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/mattdrange/2016/06/20/zuckerberg-thiel-board/#6a931ba45dd2 [http://perma.cc/LC463P33] [hereinafter Ryan Mac & Matt Drange, Mark Zuckerberg] (Facebook has recently
“attempt[ed] to court news organizations and convince them that its platform is an open
and trustworthy place to publish and distribute information. Critics of Thiel said that
his actions could have a chilling effect on the media business, providing a blueprint by
which wealthy individuals can covertly litigate against publications that they find
hurtful or unpleasing.”).
133 Ryan Mac & Matt Drange, Mark Zuckerberg, supra note 132. A petition filed
by the Writers Guild of America stated that “[a] person committed to silencing
journalism he doesn’t like should not sit on the board of a company that serves as the
portal to digital news for tens of millions of people.” Id.
134 Id.
135 See Rickard & Behrens, supra note 10 (“Courts trying to settle cases may be
unaware that their efforts may be complicated by an entity that is not even in the room.”).
136 See id.
137 Nick Denton, A Hard Peace, BLOG (Nov. 2, 2016), https://nickdenton.org/ahard-peace-e161e19bfaf#.1aewt2czo [http://perma.cc/8RA9-DJ4Q].
138 Id.
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the “all out legal war with Thiel would have cost too much, and
hurt too many people, and there was no end in sight.”139 Denton’s
statements demonstrate the impact that third-party funding of
litigation can have on the legal decisions of the opposing party
when they have knowledge that a funder exists.
But the Gawker “saga” may be far from over. On January
11, 2018, Thiel submitted a bid to purchase Gawker’s remaining
assets, including its domain names and roughly 200,000 archived
articles.140 This purchase would provide access to all of Gawker’s
content and the opportunity to remove any or all of the articles from
the Internet indefinitely.141 Former Gawker employees attempted
to raise money through a Kickstarter to bid on Gawker themselves
but failed to reach the $500,000 goal.142 Thiel’s continued interest
in Gawker further demonstrates the very personal nature of his
litigation funding.
III.

POTENTIAL ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF
MALICE MAINTENANCE

Malice maintenance empowers wealthy individuals to
decide who and what is worthy of a lawsuit. This Part explores the
potential ethical and legal implications related to this practice of
third-party funding. Where a third-party funder is motivated by a
personal vendetta or bias, there are unique conflict of interest
issues that can interfere with legal decisions. The lack of
transparency under the current state of the law serves to
exacerbate all of the issues inherent in malice maintenance.
A.

Conflict of Interest

Third-party litigation financing introduces an outsider to
the attorney-client relationship.143 According to the U.S. Chamber
Institute for Legal Reform, “TPLF investments compromise the
attorney-client relationship and diminish the professional
independence of attorneys by injecting a third party into
139 Id.; see also Peter Thiel, Peter Thiel: Online Privacy Debate Won’t End With
Gawker, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/16/opinion/peter-thielthe-online-privacy-debate-wont-end-with-gawker.html [http://perma.cc/TF9S-896Y] (Peter
Thiel states: “I will support [Bollea] until his final victory—Gawker said it intends to appeal—
and I would gladly support someone else in the same position.”).
140 Jessica, DiNapoli, Peter Thiel Submits Bid for Gawker, Faces Challenges,
REUTERS (Jan. 11, 2018, 3:55 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gawker-thiel/pet
er-thiel-submits-bid-for-gawker-faces-challenges-idUSKBN1F02V2?il=0 [http://perma.cc/
3FPA-7QC9].
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 See BEISNER ET AL., supra note 13, at 1.
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disputes.”144 An individual involved in funding a lawsuit must have
some stake in the outcome of litigation.145 That stake may be
financial, charitable, or malicious. Regardless of the motivation,
however, the addition of a third party creates the potential for
conflict of interest issues. The U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal
Reform advocates for stringent reform in the regulation of thirdparty litigation finance because “[a]rrangements such as these
make a mockery of our system of justice by placing the interests of
outside investors ahead of the interests of the parties in court.”146
The fear is that the focus of the legal strategy will not be
vindication of the plaintiff’s rights but achievement of the thirdparty funder’s objectives147—and that fear is justified.
There is no doubt that individuals who lack resources to
independently bring claims to court can benefit from third-party
funding.148 There is additional risk, however, when a third-party
funder is one person with a personal agenda.149 An individual “is
much more likely to have an agenda driven by revenge or
personal dislike or wanting to prove a point.”150 The Supreme
Court, in Button, explicitly recognized that “[r]esort[ing] to the
courts to seek vindication of constitutional rights is a different
matter from the oppressive, malicious, or avaricious use of the
legal process for purely private gain.”151 The TPLF protected by
the First Amendment is driven by the litigant and the funder’s
motivation for bringing and funding the lawsuit.152 The Court
protects TPLF as a form of political expression by public interest
groups.153 The malicious maintainer, however, may be motivated
by revenge, the desire to destroy competition, or simply by
disdain for the target—but what is even more troubling than
those nefarious objectives is the likelihood that the funder will
manipulate the legal strategy so that it is in alignment with
those objectives.154
U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 31.
See supra Part I (Third-party funders may be motivated to initiate lawsuits
for profit, personal gain, or altruism.).
146 Third Party Litigation Funding (TPLF), supra note 13.
147 See id.
148 See Lyon, supra note 43, at 582 (Through third-party funding “[n]umerous
state agencies and legal aid societies . . . provide aid to indigent litigants, a practice
which would have been unthinkable at common law.”).
149 Id.
150 Sorkin, Tech Billionaire Reveals Secret War, supra note 7 (quoting Roy D.
Simon, a professor emeritus of legal ethics at Hofstra University School of Law).
151 Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 443 (1963).
152 See id. at 437–43.
153 Id. at 439–45.
154 For example, in the Gawker case, Thiel likely influenced the decision to
dismiss Bollea’s negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, thereby removing the
insurance company from the suit. See supra Section II.C.
144

145
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At the foundation of the ancient British common law
doctrine was the desire to circumvent the ability of powerful
individuals to take advantage of the court system to maximize
their own personal and political interests.155 The same concerns
remain today.156 The idea that one wealthy, powerful individual
has the potential to destroy an entire company or organization
fueled by a personal vendetta or moral standard is antithetical
to the modern legal system’s goals of transparency and
efficiency.157 In order to achieve the goals of the third-party
funder, attorneys may engage in unsavory legal tactics.158 For
example, there may be a greater potential for prolonged
litigation in these types of arrangements in the interest of the
third-party funder.159 Prolonged litigation is possible because the
funder essentially absorbs the risks of litigation,160 allowing the
actual party to the suit to take on “a more aggressive stance, and
[to] reject what otherwise may be a fair settlement offer under
traditional litigation funding structures.”161
The danger of prolonged litigation is even greater in the
case of malice maintenance because the third-party funder need
not be concerned with the settlement at all. Unlike a litigation
investment company, for example, the malicious maintainer has
no interest in a financial return on their investment. With
enough money, the malicious maintainer can extend the lawsuit
until the target’s funds are drained or their reputation is
destroyed—in either case, settlement is not necessary to achieve
that result.162
In the case of Bollea v. Gawker, Thiel openly expressed that
his desire to become involved in the lawsuit was driven in part by
the fact that Gawker posted stories that were, in Thiel’s opinion,
155 Del Webb Cmtys, Inc. v. Partington, No. 2:08-cv-00571-RCJ-GWF, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 85616, at *10 (D. Nev. Sept. 18, 2009).
156 See Mac & Drange, Mark Zuckerberg, supra note 132 (For example, “[c]ritics
of Thiel said that his actions could have a chilling effect on the media business,
providing a blueprint by which wealthy individuals can covertly litigate against
publications that they find hurtful or unpleasing.”).
157 Id.
158 See Rickard & Behrens, supra note 10.
159 Id. (“Further, the funder’s presence can unreasonably prolong cases and
frustrate settlements.”).
160 Id. (“If a party is obligated to pay some of its settlement to a funder, that
party may have a strong incentive to reject an otherwise reasonable offer and hold out
for more money.”).
161 Sheridan, supra note 60.
162 See Roger Royse, Hulk Hogan’s Gawker Lawsuit Reignites Debate Over
Third Party Litigation Funding, ROYSE L. BLOG (June 14, 2016, 11:37 AM),
http://royselawblog.com/hulk-hogans-gawker-lawsuit-reignites-debate-over-third-partylitigation-funding/ [http://perma.cc/58Y3-FLP4] (“Without disclosure, a well-funded
plaintiff could afford to prolong litigation to hurt defendant(s).”).
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“incredibly damaging” with “no connection with the public
interest.”163 This begs the question: who should be able to decide
what is in the public’s interest? Denton expressed concern about
the weight that one powerful individual’s opinion can have:
Just because Peter Thiel is a Silicon Valley billionaire, his opinion
does not trump our millions of readers who know us for routinely
driving big news stories including Hillary Clinton’s secret email
account, Bill Cosby’s history with women, the mayor of Toronto as a
crack smoker, Tom Cruise’s role within Scientology, the N.F.L. coverup of domestic abuse by players and just this month the hidden power
of Facebook to determine the news you see.164

The clear discrepancy between Denton’s and Thiel’s assessment
of the “value” of Gawker Media simply serves to demonstrate the
potential danger of allowing wealthy individuals to inject
themselves into lawsuits based on their opinion of the target.
Imagine a wealthy individual targeting an organization like
Planned Parenthood in order to smear its reputation or cause
the organization to lose funding. Now imagine a scenario where
a political operative funds a lawsuit against his opponent to
generate bad press during the critical months of a campaign.
Tweaking the facts of Bollea v. Gawker—further suppose it was
a wealthy campaign contributor to the President of the United
States secretly funding lawsuits against a news outlet, such as
the New York Times, that published unfavorable articles about
his or her policies. The current status of the law does not
sufficiently protect against wealthy individuals secretly funding
these arrangements with an oppressive or malicious intent.165
B.

Lack of Transparency

The lack of transparency involved in TPLF is of
particular concern where individuals have a malicious ulterior
motive for financing a lawsuit. Most cases end in settlements,166
and determining what each party wants out of the lawsuit is
essential to the settlement process. The vindictive hidden
interests of a malicious third-party investor will inherently
affect the negotiation process—either preventing settlement or
a proper appeal process. For example, returning to the Gawker
Sorkin, Tech Billionaire Reveals Secret War, supra note 7.
Id.
165 See generally BURFORD, supra note 29.
166 How Courts Work: Steps in Trial, AM. B. ASS’N. http://www.americanbar.org/
groups/public_education/resources/law_related_education_network/how_courts_work/ca
ses_settling.html (Jan. 28, 2018) [http://perma.cc/4CDB-K2XK] (“Relatively few lawsuits
ever go through the full range of procedures and all the way to trial. Most civil cases are
settled by mutual agreement between the parties.”).
163

164
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case, Nick Denton specifically refused to appeal the case because
of Thiel’s funding despite his confidence that Gawker would
succeed on appeal.167
These arrangements also make it particularly difficult for
targets of malicious maintenance to defend their position. Unlike a
funder motivated by maximizing profits—a strategy that the
opposing party is likely to anticipate—here, the legal strategy to
personally harm the target may certainly come as a surprise. The
issue may be best explained by Denton in a blog post:
It’s a shame the Hogan trial took place without the motives of the
plaintiff ’ s backer being known. If there is a lasting legacy from this
experience, it should be a new awareness of the danger of dark money
in litigation finance. And that’s surely in the spirit of the transparency
Gawker was founded to promote.168

There is no real downside for wealthy funders—malicious
maintainers can stop providing funds whenever they want, or in
the alternative, they can continue to fund lawsuits in secret until
their objectives are realized.169
In the circumstances where there is misconduct,170 courts
must be aware of the presence of the third-party funders in order
to properly determine if sanctions, limiting instructions, or
adverse inferences are appropriate.171 With the current lack of
disclosure, wealthy individuals can solicit suits and target
individuals or companies that they want to harm without any
backlash, and attorneys may not be held accountable for
violating their ethical obligations. Moreover, without disclosure
it is impossible to accurately determine how often this practice
even takes place.172
C.

Current Rules Are Inadequate

While there are rules meant to protect parties from such
abuses, these safeguards are not effective in cases where thirdSee supra Section II.C.
Denton, supra note 137.
169 See Rickard & Behrens, supra note 10.
170 Misconduct could be violations of Rule 11, which includes bringing lawsuits
“being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay,
or needlessly increase the cost of litigation.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1). Misconduct
could also be violations of American Bar Association Rule 1.8 which states that “[a]
lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the
client unless: . . . [inter alia] (2) there is no interference with the lawyer’s independence
of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship . . . .” See MODEL RULE
OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(f) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). These rules are explained in more
detail in the following section. See infra Section III.C.
171 See infra Section III.C.
172 See infra Section III.C.
167
168
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party funders are involved. For example, sanctions against
attorneys are appropriate under Rule 11(b)(1) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure where representations to the court are
“being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass,
cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of
litigation.”173 But a court does not have a full picture of what is
happening in the courtroom when the “efforts [to settle are]
complicated by an entity that is not even in the room.”174 In the
circumstance where a third-party funder is involved in secret, it
is difficult to determine where sanctions are appropriate175 and
if certain actions have improper purpose or are meant to
“harass[ ] [or] cause unnecessary delay,” as per Rule 11(b)(1).176
In the case of malice maintenance, this is particularly
concerning. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for the court
to realize that a party’s actions have been influenced by a thirdparty funder’s improper personal agenda where the existence of
a third-party funder is unknown to the court.
Although funders in these types of arrangements do not
have any ethical obligations to preserve the interests of the
claimants,177 there are safeguards in place to prevent attorneys
from acting in the interest of a third party rather than their
client. For example, American Bar Association Rule 1.8(f) states
that “[a] lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing
a client from one other than the client unless: . . . [inter alia] (2)
there is no interference with the lawyer’s independence of
professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship.”178
Enforcement of these guidelines is impossible, though, where the
third-party funder is financing the lawsuit in secret.179 Without the
court or the opposing party being aware that a third party is
financing a suit there is no way to know that a claimant’s rights
have been compromised. Therefore, the non-disclosure of the thirdparty funder curtails the effectiveness of ABA Rule 1.8(f). Since the
majority of states permit maintenance,180 there is a real danger
that third-party funders have the ability to secretly manipulate the
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1).
Rickard & Behrens, supra note 10.
175 Id. (“Where sanctions are appropriate for misconduct, courts need to know
about the presence of a third-party in the litigation to determine how to impose sanctions
or other costs.”).
176 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1).
177 Id.
178 See MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(f) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (“A
lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the
client unless: . . . [inter alia] (2) there is no interference with the lawyer’s independence
of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship . . . .”).
179 See generally BURFORD, supra note 29.
180 See supra Section I.C.
173
174
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outcome of the suit, potentially to the detriment of the claimant,
despite the rules in place to prevent those abuses.181
IV.

RECOMMENDATION FOR REGULATION OF THIRD-PARTY
LITIGATION FUNDING

Given the inherent risks of malice maintenance in thirdparty litigation funding, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(Federal Rules) should be amended to allow uniform regulation
at the federal level. Since disclosure is not currently required,
there is no data related to how often malice maintenance occurs,
which makes it difficult to specifically regulate.182 Thus, a
general disclosure rule is the best method to address the
negative effects of TPLF and allow courts to make individual
rulings to prevent or sanction misconduct.183
The support in the legal community for transparency in
third-party litigation funding gives an added incentive for the
Federal Rules to be amended. Various legal associations have
advocated for amendments to the Federal Rules that would
require disclosure of third-party litigation funding.184 In
addition, courts appear receptive to disclosure of third-party
funding in lawsuits—a 2014 survey conducted for the Law and
Economics Center at George Mason University’s Antonin Scalia
Law School revealed that a disclosure rule for litigation finance
would be favored by both federal and state judges.185 In addition, the
Northern District of California Rules Committee recently moved to
expose third-party litigation funding in a proposed amendment to

See BEISNER ET AL., supra note 13, at 1–2.
Rickard & Behrens, supra note 10 (“[B]ecause third-party funding of
lawsuits occurs in secrecy, the proof needed to support reform is elusive.”).
183 Id.
184 Those groups include the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform,
American Insurance Association, American Tort Reform Association, and National
Association of Manufacturers and Lawyers for Civil Justice. See Lisa A. Rickard, Third
Party Litigation Funding in US Enters Mainstream, Leading to Calls for Reform,
FINANCIER WORLDWIDE (Nov. 2016), http://www.financierworldwide.com/third-partylitigation-funding-in-us-enters-mainstream-leading-to-calls-for-reform#.WBtpSeErLR2
[http://perma.cc/K6JP-ASHW]; see also Letter from John H. Beisner of Skadden, Arps,
Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP to Jonathan C. Rose, Sec’y of the Comm. on Rules of Practice
and Procedure of the Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts (Oct. 28, 2014), http://
www.lfcj.com/uploads/3/8/0/5/38050985/letter_from_j_beisner_to_j_rose__10-28-14_.pdf
[http://perma.cc/BJ3E-XUFX].
185 The survey involved 357 federal and state judges across the country “with
an average experience of over 17 years on the bench.” Almost two-thirds of the judges
surveyed agreed that “they would prefer to know if litigation funding is being employed
in cases before them” and “[t]wo-thirds . . . also reported that they believe the practice of
litigation funding is not acceptable and will increase the number of lawsuits.” Rickard &
Behrens, supra note 10.
181

182
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Local Rule 3-15 that would require attorneys to disclose to the court
when their case is backed by a third-party investor.186
A.

Proposed Amendment to Rule 26 Duty to Disclose

An amendment to Federal Rule 26 that requires initial
disclosure of third-party funders of a lawsuit to both the court
and opposing parties will address the legal and ethical concerns
related to malice maintenance. Rule 26, titled “Duty to Disclose”
(Rule 26) currently requires numerous initial disclosures
including the name, address, and telephone number of any
individual with discoverable information, a copy—or description
and location—of all discovery “that the disclosing party has in
its possession, custody, or control and may use to support its
claims or defenses,” as well as damage calculations. 187 In
addition, Rule 26 requires that a defendant disclose “any
insurance agreement under which an insurance business may
be liable to satisfy all or part of a possible judgment in the action
or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the
judgment.”188 Some of the underlying policies behind these
disclosure requirements are elimination of the “surprise”
element in litigation, reduction of litigation costs, and
encouragement of fair outcomes.189 What Rule 26 does not
require, however, is that a party disclose the existence of a thirdparty funder to the court or opposing parties.190
This note’s proposed amendment would add subsection
(F), requiring initial disclosure of a third-party funder to the
court, and subsection (G), requiring disclosure to opposing
parties. The proposed Rule 26 (a)(1)(F) is modeled after the
California Local Civil Rule 3-15, which requires disclosure of
“[n]on-party interested entities or persons.”191 Under the
California Rule, the certificate of interested entities or persons
is filed as part of the public record, and does not apply to any

186 Northern District of California Rules Committee Moves to Expose ThirdParty Litigation Funding, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM (Nov. 1, 2016),
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/resource/northern-district-of-california-rules-commi
ttee-moves-to-expose-third-party-litigation-funding [https://perma.cc/FWJ9-9E3X]. As of
January 2018, however, Rule 3-15 was not ultimately amended to explicitly include
third-party funders. See N.D. Cal. Civil L.R. 3-15.
187 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(i)–(iii).
188 Id. at (a)(iv).
189 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1970, 2000, and 2006
amendment.
190 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26.
191 N.D. Cal. Civil L. R. 3-15.
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governmental agencies or entities.192 In comparison, the
proposed Rule 26 (a)(1)(F) will explicitly require disclosure of
third-party funders to the court under seal and does not exclude
any form of third-party funders. In addition, subsection (G) will
require limited disclosure to opposing parties. The proposed
Rules 26 (A)(1)(F) and (G) could read as follows:
Rule 26 Duty to Disclose; General Provisions Governing Discovery
(F) Disclosure of Third-Party Funders to the Court
(i) All parties must disclose the name, address, and telephone
number of any third party to the lawsuit, either entity or
individual, providing funding to a party of the lawsuit.
(ii) All parties must submit to the court a brief description of the
third party’s interest in the legal dispute, including any financial
or personal interest, or any interest that would be affected by the
outcome of the lawsuit.
(iii) If a party has no disclosure to make pursuant to
subparagraph (a)(1)(F)(i), that party must submit to the court a
certification that no third-party funder is involved. A party has a
continuing duty to supplement its submission if a third-party
funder becomes involved at any point in time during the lawsuit.
(iv) The court has discretion to disclose any or all information to
opposing parties that is critical to the settlement or appeal
process.
(G) Disclosure of Third-party Funders to Opposing Parties
(i) All parties must provide notice of the existence of third-party
funders to opposing parties.
(ii) Notice does not require the name of the third-party funder or any
personal or additional information related to the third-party funder.
(iii) Notice should be provided at any point during the lawsuit
when a third-party funder becomes involved.

B.

Benefits of Amending Rule 26

With the court finally aware of the presence of the thirdparty funder, it will have the opportunity to address any
192 Id. The California Committee’s Drafting of Rule 3-15 explicitly included
“litigation funders” as persons or entities that attorneys are required to disclose. See
PROPOSED N.D. CAL. CIVIL L. R. 3-15 (proposed June 2016), available at http://pdfser
ver.amlaw.com/ca/ndcal_proposal.pdf [http://perma.cc/8ALX-ZTNW]. The proposed rule
would have “explicitly cover[ed] litigation agreements in the routine disclosures about
interested parties that lawyers must submit when filing a case.” Ben Hancock, Move to
Expose Third-Party Case Funding Stirs Debate in Northern District, RECORDER (Oct. 31,
2016, 3:08 PM), https://www.law.com/therecorder/almID/1202771211351/ [http://perma.cc/
W88E-LJR4].
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suspicious legal strategies and hold lawyers accountable.193
Requiring disclosure of any personal interest in the lawsuit will
ensure that the court is privy to any improper personal agenda
or serious conflicts of interest.194 Disclosure will also serve to
deter malice maintenance because the identities of funders will
be revealed to the court at the outset of the suit. Without an
element of secrecy, funders will be less likely to intervene in
suits where they have a personal vendetta or bias against the
target. In addition, attorneys are far less likely to allow thirdparty funders to influence legal strategy. With the court aware
of third-party funders, consequences for violations to ABA Rule
1.8(f) on Conflict of Interest and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
Rule 11(b)(1) as related to harassing, frivolous, or prolonged
litigation can be properly enforced.195
Rule 26 currently requires disclosure of insurance
coverage to opposing parties.196 The Advisory Committee of the
1970 Amendment of Rule 26 clarified the policy considerations
for including insurance disclosure such as enabling both parties
to realistically appraise their cases, promoting transparency in
settlement and litigation strategies, and avoiding prolonged
litigation.197 The policy considerations that the committee
described are the same underlying concerns that support
disclosure of third-party funders.198 Providing notice to opposing
parties will minimize the unfair disadvantage for the entities
targeted by malice maintenance by increasing transparency and
allowing parties to better defend their position.199 As the Rules
Committee succinctly explained—disclosure “will enable counsel
for both sides to make the same realistic appraisal of the case,
so that settlement and litigation strategy are based on
See Rickard & Behrens, supra note 10.
See Shannon, supra note 19, at 904 (“Disclosing the name of the funder to
the judge or arbitrator, however, is essential to maintaining the integrity and
independence of decisionmakers.”).
195 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1); MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(f) (AM.
BAR ASS’N 1983) (“A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from
one other than the client unless: . . . [inter alia] (2) there is no interference with the
lawyer’s independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer
relationship . . . .”).
196 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iv) (Litigants are required to disclose “any
insurance agreement under which an insurance business may be liable to satisfy all or
part of a possible judgment in the action or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made
to satisfy the judgement.”).
197 “Disclosure of insurance coverage will enable counsel for both sides to make
the same realistic appraisal of the case, so that settlement and litigation strategy are
based on knowledge and not speculation. It will conduce to settlement and avoid
protracted litigation in some cases, though in others it may have an opposite effect.” FED.
R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment.
198 Id.
199 See Rickard & Behrens, supra note 10.
193

194
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knowledge and not speculation.”200 This will mitigate the danger
of unnecessarily prolonged litigation and expenditure of
excessive amounts of funds.201
The Rules Committee distinguished insurance coverage
from other disclosures related to the defendant’s financial
status, “(1) because insurance is an asset created specifically to
satisfy the claim; (2) because the insurance company ordinarily
controls the litigation; (3) because information about coverage is
available only from defendant or his insurer; and (4) because
disclosure does not involve a significant invasion of privacy.”202
Third-party litigation funders should be disclosed for the same
reasons that the Rules Committee advocated that insurance
coverage be disclosed. First, although it would depend on the
specifics of the third-party funder financing agreement to
determine whether the third-party funder is an “asset,”203 thirdparty funders and insurance companies still essentially serve
the same purpose. The same way an insurer provides financial
assistance,204 a third-party funder is an external source of
funding that covers any or all of the applicable party’s expenses
during the lawsuit. Second, as an external source of capital, a
third-party funder operates like an insurer and also has the
potential to control the course of the litigation.205 Third, exactly
like insurance coverage, the information related to the thirdparty funder is only available from the applicable party and
their third-party funder.206 Finally, requiring disclosure of only
the existence of a third-party funder is not a significant invasion
of privacy, and would still benefit opposing counsel by
encouraging transparency and fair outcomes.
Armed with the knowledge that a third-party funder
exists, opposing counsel will be able to appeal to the court if any
potential conflicts of interest or questionable legal strategies are
detected.207 Pursuant to the proposed Rule 26 (a)(1)(G), the court
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment (emphasis added).
Id.
202 Id.
203 Asset, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/asset.asp [http://
perma.cc/6MFC-R23L] (“[A] resource with economic value that an individual, corporation
or country owns or controls with the expectation that it will provide a future benefit.”).
204 Andrew Weiner & Joseph Saka, The Basics of Commercial General Liability
Policies, AM. BAR ASS’N.,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_practice_
series/the_basics_of_commercial_general_liability_policies.html [http://perma.cc/C535DP9Q] (“The insuring agreement gives the insurer the right and imposes upon the
insurer the duty to defend any suit seeking covered damages from the policyholder.”).
205 See Third Party Litigation Funding (TPLF), supra note 13.
206 See generally BURFORD, supra note 29.
207 See Rickard & Behrens, supra note 10.
200
201
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will already have the information related to the third party
necessary to effectively address the situation and make a proper
determination.208 In addition, in the unique situation where
disclosure of additional information related to the third-party
funder is critical to settlement, the court has the discretion to
disclose that information to opposing parties.209
Disclosure will regulate third-party funding in a manner
that will address the potential negative implication of malice
maintenance and help regulate issues with third-party litigation in
the future. Given the current state of the law, it is unknown how
often this practice occurs, but requiring disclosure will allow data
to be collected that could help determine the most concerning
issues with this practice and how widespread it truly is.210
CONCLUSION
Malice maintenance amplifies the legal and ethical
concerns related to TPLF by empowering wealthy individuals to
instigate and influence litigation for personal interests without
consequences.211 Maintenance was abolished from British
common law precisely because these types of arrangements
allowed powerful individuals to take advantage of the court
system for purely personal and political gain.212 Although some
states have abolished antimaintenance laws, 213 the underlying
ethical concerns related to the instigation of oppressive spiteful
lawsuits remain today.214

See supra Section IV.A.
See supra Section IV.A. (The Proposed Rule 26 (a)(1)(F)(iv) allows the court
discretion to disclose any or all information to opposing parties that is critical to the
settlement or appeal process.).
210 See Rickard & Behrens, supra note 10. This proposed amendment is only
one step to help solve the issues with malice maintenance. Once there are rules in place
requiring these disclosures, more steps will likely have to be taken to continue to help
protect the legal system, but we cannot take those steps until this issue is less hidden.
211 Id.
212 Del Webb Cmtys, Inc. v. Partington, No. 2:08-cv-00571-RCJ-GWF, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 85616, at *10 (D. Nev. Sept. 18, 2009).
213 Sheridan, supra note 60.
214 See Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
443 (1963) (“Resort[ing] to the courts to seek vindication of constitutional rights is a
different matter from the oppressive, malicious, or avaricious use of the legal process for
purely private gain.”); see also In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 436 (1978) (The record
reflected no “undue influence, overreaching, misrepresentation, or invasion of privacy”
or “[any] serious likelihood of conflict of interest”); see also Rancman v. Interim
Settlement Funding Corp. 789 N.E.2d 217, 220 (Ohio 2003) (“[M]aintenance is ‘an offense
against public justice, as it keeps alive stride and contention, and perverts the remedial
practice of the law into an engine of oppression’”.) (quoting Key v. Vattier, 1 Ohio 132,
136 (1823)); Echeverria v. Estate of Lindner, No. 018666/2002, 2005 WL 1083704, *7
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) (“While [the defendant] has not had any control over the litigation,
208
209
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By requiring disclosure of third-party funders, courts will
be able to manage the very serious implications of malice
maintenance. Disclosure will enable better enforcement of the
existing rules that prohibit improper or harassing legal tactics and
third-party interference with legal strategy.215 An amendment to
Rule 26 requiring initial disclosure of third-party funders of a
lawsuit to both the court and opposing parties will eliminate the
“surprise” element of third-party funding, reduce the risk of
excessive prolonged litigation, and encourage fair outcomes.216 The
proposed amendment will provide a necessary check on malice
maintenance, which is otherwise unregulated and unknown to the
courts. Disclosure will help prevent malice maintenance from
“runnin’ wild,”217 and thwart billionaires that abuse the court
system to maximize their own personal and political interests.
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part of the policy behind Champerty is to prevent non-interested third parties from
taking part in litigation.”).
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